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Abstract—In this paper, we propose an architecture for
Blockchain-based Electronic Medical Records (EMRs) called
GAA-FQ (Granular Access Authorisation supporting Flexible
Queries) that comprises an access model and an access au-
thorisation scheme. Unlike existing Blockchain schemes, our
access model can authorise different levels of granularity of
authorisation, whilst maintaining compatibility with the under-
lying Blockchain data structure. Furthermore, the authorisation,
encryption, and decryption algorithms proposed in the GAA-FQ
scheme dispense with the need to use a public key infrastructure
(PKI) and hence improve the computation performance needed
to support more granular and distributed, yet authorised, EMR
data queries. We validated the computation performance and
transmission efficiency for GAA-FQ using a simulation of GAA-
FQ against an access control scheme for EMRs called ESPAC as
our baseline that was not designed using a Blockchain. To the best
of our knowledge, GAA-FQ is the first Blockchain-oriented access
authorisation scheme with granular access control, supporting
flexible data queries, that has been proposed for secure EMR
information management.
Index Terms—privacy protection, access authorisation, EMR
management, Internet of Things.
I. INTRODUCTION
The global eHealth or Health Informatics market is expected
to be over 300 billion dollars (in N. America) by 2022 [1].
Electronic medical records (EMRs) are a key element of
this. EMRs tend to be highly distributed in terms of who
(local doctor, hospital doctor, administrator etc.) has modified
what and where (e.g., in hospital, doctor surgery, care homes,
private homes etc.) this is done. For example, driven in part
by the use of Internet of Things (IoT), wearable eHealth
devices can be used outside healthcare centres, enabling not
just health providers, but also health users, to monitor their
own health status anywhere and anytime [2, 3]. Management
of EMRs including secure storage and access control, is a
crucial requirement for eHealth [4], yet is very challenging
to achieve because of the highly distributed and fragmented
nature of EMRs and the range of providers and users who are
authorised to access them.
The use of a Blockchain model is currently being investigat-
ed as a highly distributed data structure for EMR transactions
(to store, query and share) that enables them to be verified
and recorded through a consensus of all parties involved [5].
Blockchain inherently enables data integrity i.e. inherently
resistant to modification of the data [6]. One of the key
challenges here for EMR’s use of a Blockchain is that the
inherent focus of a Blockchain is not to limit unauthorised,
granular access to avoid specific confidential parts of an EMR
implemented using a Blockchain.
As EMRs hold personal data about patients that can be
confidential in different ways to different stakeholders, ap-
proaches to construct flexible and granular access authorisation
to eHealth records is needed. However, the block funda-
mentally does not offer an appropriate level of granularity
for queries and authorisation in some eHealth scenarios. For
example, if a disease analyst tries to determine the incidence
of different diseases in an EMR database, the data obtained
by the analyst should only reveal the disease name in each
block. When a nurse wants to check the drug injection doses
of several patients, the information revealed to the nurse should
only include patient names, IDs and drug dosage. But under
the current access granularity (block), other private data of
patients, e.g. other data such as social security numbers and
home addresses may be present in the block, which are not
related to the work of the analyst and the nurse, yet can be
disclosed. This challenge motivates us to present a new EMR
access architecture to achieve a more precise granularity, and
flexibility, for queries and access authorisation.
Related Work. Research regarding the security of applying
Blockchain is currently still in its infancy in the eHealth field.
[7] proposes an access architecture, Healthcare Data Gateways
(HDG) for Blockchain use in eHealth, however, its access
granularity is based upon blocks. It cannot support data queries
to specific data attributes in blocks or restrict the access autho-
risation to these attributes. [8] discusses permission controls
to a Blockchain for implementing secure EMRs in different
use case scenarios. A simple system structure for applying
Blockchain in eHealth is presented, but the granularity of the
permission control for queries is not considered. Furthermore,
there are no detailed schemes or algorithms proposed. [9] im-
plements consent management in eHealth using a Blockchain
but there is no exhaustive authorisation design.
There have been various attempts to address the authori-
sation requirement for EMR in eHealth. [10] constructs an
access control scheme, called ESPAC, to implement gran-
ularity authorisation for data queries, based upon attribute-
based encryption (ABE) in eHealth. However, ESPAC is not
Blockchain-oriented, i.e. the applied access authorisation in
the scheme is for a conventional data storage structure (grid
structure). Accessing one attribute of all patients requires the
permission of every other patient there. Therefore, queries for
one or several attributes cannot be authorised independently.
Moreover, the method of public key encryption used in ABE
is time-consuming as it involves bilinear pairing [11]. This is
too heavy-weight to be supported in more resource-constrained
eHealth IoT devices. [12] presents an access control scheme
for eHealth based upon elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) but
there is no support to control the access granularity in the
proposed authorisation process.
Our Contribution. Compared with the existing access
authorisation schemes in eHealth [7, 8, 10, 12], we highlight
three novel contributions. First, to the best of our knowl-
edge, our scheme is the first Blockchain-oriented authorisation
scheme with granularity control. Second, compared with the
schemes in [7, 10], the granularity of authorisation in our
scheme can support different types of queries (on blocks, val-
ues of attributes or both). Third, the authorisation, encryption
and decryption in our scheme does need not to rely on the
public key encryption or public key infrastructure (PKI), this
lowering the computation time needed.
Organisation. The remainder of the paper is organised as
follows. Preliminaries is used to understand our architecture,
i.e., the general Blockchain and Shamir’s Secret Sharing
scheme are summarised in Section II. Then, our proposed
access model is introduced in Section III. After that, we
discuss the security model of our authorisation scheme in
Section IV. Section V describes the performance simulation
of the scheme, which is followed by the final Section VI to
offer the conclusions of our work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. General Blockchain
Generally, a Blockchain [13] stems from the link between
two blocks. Each block contains data, a cryptographic hash
value (h) and a timestamp (ts), and the data can contain several
attributes and their values. The hash value of one block is
produced by the previous hash value and the data in current
block. It means that the hash value is applied for establishing
the link between two blocks and any fallacious and distorted
data would be figured out by verifying the hash value. A
general Blockchain is demonstrated as follows (Figure. 1).
Fig. 1: The general Blockchain model
In this model, the hash values are generated by two rules:
h1 = Hash(data1jjts1)
hi = Hash(hi 1jjdataijjtsi); i = 2:::n
B. Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme
Shamir’s secret sharing is a common method for realising
data access control. In this scheme,a secret y is divided into
n shares and shared among n shareholders. If any t or more
than t shares are given, it is able to reconstruct the secret y,
but with fewer than t shares, it cannot reconstruct the secret.
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme (SSharing) is based on
Lagrange interpolating polynomials. There are n shareholders
U = fU1; :::; Ung and a large random prime q. The scheme
consists of the following algorithms:
 SSharing.Generation(q, y): This algorithm takes the prime
q and the secret y2Zq and does the following:
1. Pick a polynomial f(x) of degree t 1 randomly: f(x) =
a0+a1x+ :::+at 1xt 1 (mod p), where the secret y = a0 =
f(0) and all coefficients a0; a1; :::; at 1 are random in Zq .
2. Compute all shares: yi = f(xi) (mod q) for i = 1; :::; n,
where xi2Zq are picked randomly.
3. Output a list of n points f(x1; y1); (x2; y2); :::; (xn; yn)g.
Each share yi is distributed to corresponding shareholder Ui
privately. Note that xi need not be kept secretly.
 SSharing.Reconstruction(q,(xi1 ,yi1),...,(xit ,yit )): This al-
gorithm takes the prime q and any t points
f(xi1 ; yi1); :::; (xit ; yit)g as inputs, it reconstructs and
outputs the secret y as
y = f(0) =
P
i2Aiyi (mod q),
where i =
Q
j2A=fig
xj
xj xi (mod q) are the Lagrange
interpolation coefficients and A = fi1; :::; itg  f1; :::; ng.
III. PROPOSED ACCESS MODEL
There are three layers in the proposed model (Figure. 2):
user layer, agent layer and storage layer. The agent layer and
storage layer are located in the same trusted cloud. Next, we
introduce the three layers of our access model in Figure. 2 and
illustrate the functions of each layer.
Fig. 2: The proposed access model
1) User layer: This layer represents data inquirers e.g.
doctors, patients, data analysts and even monitoring devices of
health. The data inquirers initiate queries to obtain data from
the storage layer. All the queries will be processed through the
agent layer. Note that doctors and patients normally query one
or several blocks; while data analysts usually query values of
different attributes (columns) in blocks to analyse morbidity
and the incidence of the population. Therefore, we define three
different levels of granularity for queries for different users:
(i) block query, users request one or certain blocks on a chain;
(ii) attribute query, users only request all the data of particular
attributes; (iii) mixed query: users aim to obtain the data of
particular attributes from specified blocks.
2) Agent layer: There are two major aims of the agent layer.
The first aim is to aggregate the queried data since the data
could be entire blocks or columns from blocks. The second
aim is to check the inquirers’ access permission for the queried
data and to authorise the access from the valid inquirers. In
this proposed model, the agent layer can check the access
permission for every block and attribute. If the inquirers have
all the access permission for the queried blocks and attributes,
the agent layer can authorise the access and then return the
requested data. Otherwise, the agent layer should deny the
access request. Note that the style of the returned data is
determined by the granularity of the queries. It can be many
blocks or only the data of several attributes in certain blocks.
3) Storage layer: In this layer, all the medical records for
eHealth are stored in a Blockchain. Another function of this
layer is to provide the queried data to the agent layer.
IV. PROPOSED AUTHORISATION SCHEME
In this section, we first propose our authorisation scheme,
GAA-FQ (Granular Access Authorisation supporting Flexible
Queries) and then prove its correctness. After that, the security
of our proposed scheme is analysed.
A. The Proposed Scheme
1) Setup(): This procedure outputs public parameters pp
with the security parameter  using the following steps.
1. Generate a big prime q.
2. Generate a random integer token BT 2 Zq for each
block B on the Blockchain and write BT in B. Note this
step should be executed when a new block is added to the
Blockchain to keep the integrity of the whole Block chain.
3. Generate a random integer token AT 2 Zq for each
attribute A included in the blocks of the Blockchain. All
(A;AT ) pairs can be stored in a new Blockchain BCAT
separately. Note we assume that all the valid users have
acquired the corresponding tokens they should have before
they request data from the Blockchain.
4. Select one secure cryptographic hash function H :
f0; 1g ! f0; 1g
5. Select a symmetric encryption algorithm, e.g., AES
(Advanced Encryption Standard) [14].
6. Output pp = (q;BCAT ;H;AES)
2) Query(pp): The user (data inquirer) prepares the query
Q via following steps.
1. Choose the type of the query T from the defined three
granularity queries: (i) block query, (ii) attribute query, and
(iii) mixed query. Note that for illustrating the remaining parts
of the proposed scheme clearly we assume the type of the
query is a block query and the amount of queried blocks is
n > 1.
2. Prepare the sequence S1 including all the identities
of requested blocks. For example, S1 should include all the
identities of blocks n: S1 = fBidi ji = 1:::ng based upon our
prior assumption.
3. Prepare the sequence S2 including all the tokens of
requested blocks. For the given sequence S1 in step 2, S2 =
fBTiji = 1:::ng.
4. Calculate the hash value HT of S2 via HT =
H(BT1; BT2; :::; BTn).
5. Send the query Q = (S1;HT ) to the agent layer.
3) Authorise(pp;Q): The agent layer validates the access
permission in Q from the user via the following steps.
1. Repeat step 3 in Query with S1 2 Q to obtain S02 =
fBT 0i ji = 1:::ng from the storage layer.
2. Calculate the hash value H 0T of S
0
2 via H
0
T =
H(BT 01; BT
0
2; :::; BT
0
n).
3. If HT = H 0T holds, it means the user can be authorised
to access the queried data, otherwise, the agent layer should
deny the access request. The agent layer continues the next
phases under the successful authorisation.
4) Encrypt(pp;Q; S02): The agent layer encrypts the
queried data via the following steps.
1. Acquire the queried data M based upon S1 2 Q from
the storage layer then calculate the hash value HM of the data
M : HM = H(M).
2. Generate a secure key k 2 Zq .
3. Use AES to encryptM with key k to get the ciphertext
C = AESk(M;HM ). For decrypting AESk(M;HM ) to
recover the plain data M , AES0k is defined as the decryption
process: M = AES0k(C = AESk(M;HM )).
3. Follow the SSharing.Generation in Section II.B to
construct a polynomial f(x) of degree n with k and S02:
f(x) = k +BT 01x+BT
0
2x
2 + :::+BT 0nx
n (mod q).
4. Generate a random integer xp 2 Zq and calculate a
point P (xp; yp = f(xp)).
5. Return (C;P ) to the inquirer to finish the authorisation
and data transmission.
5) Decrypt(pp;Q;C; P ): The user has all the valid access
permissions for the queried data and can decrypt the ciphertext
C after the Authorise and the Encrypt phases via the following
steps.
1. Use the sequence S2 = fBTiji = 1:::ng organised
in former Query phase to construct a polynomial g(x) based
upon the SSharing.Generation in Section II.B:
g(x) = a0 +BT1x+BT2x
2 + :::+BTnx
n (mod q).
2. Follow the SSharing.Reconstruction in Section II.B to
recover the key k = g(0) = a0 2 Zq for AES decryption
with P (xp; yp):
k = yp  BT1xp  BT2x2p   ::: BTnxnp (mod q).
3. Decrypt C to retrieve the plaintext (M;HM ) =
AES0k(C) = AES
0
k(AESk(M;HM )).
4. If H(M) = HM holds, this algorithm outputs M ;
otherwise, it outputs ?.
The following Figure. 3 shows the work flow of our scheme.
B. Correctness
In the Authorise phase, HT = H 0T is the condition for a
successful authorisation.
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Fig. 3: The work flow of GAA-FQ
HT = H
0
T
, H(S2) = H(S02)
, H(fBT1; BT2; :::; BTng) = H(fBT 01; BT 02; :::; BT 0ng)
, fBT1; BT2; :::; BTng = fBT 01; BT 02; :::; BT 0ng
It means the user can pass the Authorise phase if and only
if this user has all the corresponding access permission tokens
for the requested blocks.
In the Decrypt phase, the authorised inquirer can retrieve
the key k = a0 2 Zq for AES decryption based upon the
SSharing.Reconstruction. Given a point P (xp; yp) on the poly-
nomial f(x), it should be on the correct reconstructed polyno-
mial as well. Because the condition fBT1; BT2; :::; BTng =
fBT 01; BT 02; :::; BT 0ng holds after the authorisation, the recon-
structed polynomial g(x) is same as the original polynomial
f(x) except for the unknown first coefficient a0. This means
determining the secret g(0) = a0 = k 2 Zq requires only one
point (shareholder) P (xp; yp):
k = a0
= g(xp) BT1xp  BT2x2p   ::: BTnxnp
= yp  BT1xp  BT2x2p   ::: BTnxnp
= f(xp) BT1xp  BT2x2p   ::: BTnxnp
= f(xp) BT 01xp  BT 02x2p   ::: BT 0nxnp
= k (mod q).
Hence, the authorised user can reconstruct the polynomial
g(x) and restore the correct key k for the Decrypt phase.
C. Security Analysis
In this section, we analyse the security of our authorisation
scheme from two different angles, data confidentiality and
integrity.
1) Confidentiality: The confidentiality we focus on is be-
tween the user layer and the agent layer. There are two
potential attacks may occur in the communications between
the user layer and the agent layer.
(i) The user tries to access the data but without the
corresponding access permission. For example, the user re-
quests the data for several attributes S1 = fA1; A2; :::; Ang,
however, this user only has the partial access token-
s fAT1; AT2; :::; ATn 1g for fA1; A2; :::; An 1g. There-
fore, the user forges the access token AT n 2 Zq
for the attribute An then constructs the fake S2 =
fAT1; AT2; :::; ATn 1; AT ng to calculate the hash value
HT = H(S

2 ) = H(AT1; AT2; :::; ATn 1; AT

n). Finally, the
user sends the query Q = (S1;HT ) to the agent query.
For the agent layer, the true token sequence queried from the
storage layer is S02 = fAT 01; AT 02; :::; AT 0n 1; AT 0ng. Although
8i 2 f1::n   1g; ATi = AT 0i holds, the user only has the
advantage Pr[AT 0n = AT

n ] =
1
jZqj to satisfy the condition
AT 0n = AT

n , where jZqj represents the number of all the
elements in Zq . Note that Zq is a large discrete space as q
is a big prime. Thus, jZqj is big enough to keep the user’s
advantage Pr[AT 0n = AT

n ] is negligible. Also, the probability
of S2 = S
0
2 is negligible as well. As a result, the user cannot
pass the Authorise phase (see Section IV.A.3) since Pr[HT =
H 0T ] is negligible based upon the above analysis.
(ii) The communications between the user layer and the
agent layer are eavesdropped on by the attacker. The attacker
can obtain all the data from the communications between the
user layer and the agent layer. Based upon our scheme, the data
includes the query Q = (S1; HT ) and the response (C;P ).
If the attacker modifies the query Q, it cannot pass through
the Authorise phase in our scheme based upon the security
analysis (i). On the other hand, the attacker cannot retrieve
the plain data M only with Q and (C;P ) because of the
following two reasons. Firstly, the attacker cannot recover
the correct sequence of access tokens from the hash value
HT since the secure cryptographic hash function is a one-
way function. Thus, the attacker cannot determine the correct
coefficients of the polynomial g(x). Secondly, the proper
polynomial including the point P cannot be determined since
the only one point P could be on an infinite number of
polynomials. As a result, the attacker cannot carry on the
SSharing.Reconstruction or recover the key k = a0 2 Zq to
decrypt ciphertext C without the correct g(x).
2) Integrity: If the attacker eavesdrop upon the communica-
tions between the user layer and the agent layer, the attacker
can challenge the integrity with the intercepted data (C;P )
through three methods.
 Forged C: If the attacker changes C to C, the user
can still recover the correct key k to decrypt C. However,
based upon the AES algorithm, the decrypted AES0k(C
) =
(M; HM) is changed and the attacker cannot control M
and HM to make H(M) = HM hold via tampering C.
Hence, step 4 of the Decrypt phase in our scheme outputs ?
to the input (C; P ) to indicate the failed integrity check.
 Forged P : If the attacker replaces the point P to a
fake point P , the user can only recover an incorrect key
k after the SSharing.Reconstruction to decrypt C. However,
based upon the AES algorithm, the decrypted AES0k(C) =
(M; HM) is changed and the attacker cannot control M
and HM to make H(M) = HM hold via tampering k.
Hence, step 4 of the Decrypt phase outputs ? to the input
(C;P ) to indicate the failed integrity check.
 Forged (C; P ): This situation is a combination of the
former two situations Forged C and Forged P . Therefore,
we can follow the above analysis for Forged C and Forged
P  to acquire the following conclusion. The attacker cannot
control M and HM to make H(M) = HM hold via
tampering C or k so that the step 4 of the Decrypt phase
outputs ? to the input (C; P ) to indicate the failed integrity
check.
Overall, when attacks happen to the communications be-
tween the user layer and the agent layer, our scheme offers
sufficient security to ensure that both the confidentiality of the
transported data and the data integrity is preserved based upon
the security analysis.
V. PERFORMANCE SIMULATION
There are two parts to be illustrated in this section. The first
part is the theoretical comparison of cryptographic operations.
In the second part, the computational time efficiency for
performance of GAA-FQ is evaluated with respect to the time
cost for transmitting encrypted data over Wi-Fi. The reason
for evaluating the time cost of data transmission over Wi-Fi is
that a lower usage time of Wi-Fi means lower power cost for
the resource-constrained eHealth devices when transmitting or
receiving data. Since there is yet no clear best practice to be
used as a baseline for comparison, we select a granularity
access authorisation scheme based upon cloud computing
named ESPAC [10] as our baseline. ESPAC is also applied in
eHealth but uses conventional (non-Blockchain) data structure.
A. Theoretical Comparison
The two major cryptographic operations used in ESPAC
[10] are bilinear pairing and scalar multiplication. We denote
by Opair an operation of the bilinear pairing, and Omul an
operation of the scalar multiplication in ESPAC. The notation
Oexp represents the modular exponentiation operation needed
in GAA-FQ. Because the used quantity of the cryptographic
operations is determined by the number of required tokens in
GAA-FQ (resp. attributes in ESPAC), we assume the number
of the tokens (resp. attributes) used in the authorisation of
the two schemes is k for the equal-scale comparison of used
operations. The result is given in Table I.
TABLE I: Theoretical comparison of used operations
GAA-FQ ESPAC
Encryption kOexp 1Opair + 2kOmul
Decryption kOexp k(2Opair +Omul)
Note that there are other cryptographic algorithms used in
schemes GAA-FQ and ESPAC, e.g. hash summary and AES.
However, time complexity of these algorithms is negligible
[15] when compared to the denoted operations. Hence, these
algorithms are not taken into account in the above comparison.
B. Simulation Comparison
In this part, we describe our simulation to compare the
time efficiency of computation and transmission for the two
schemes. All the results are averaged over 10 runs for each
number of the used tokens (resp. attributes). The devices for
our simulation use are a conventional computer with an Intel
i5-4200H processor running at 3.30GHz, and a Raspberry Pi
2 as a low-resource eHelath device.
We first vary the number of the tokens used for authorisation
in GAA-FQ (resp. attributes in ESPAC) to compare the time
taken for the encryption and decryption algorithms in the
two schemes on the conventional computer. The simulation
is implemented using MIRACL (Multiprecision Integer and
Rational Arithmetic C/C++ Library) [16] and cpabe toolk-
it [17]. They can support all the necessary symmetric-key
and asymmetric-key cryptographic algorithms, and ciphertext-
policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE). Note that the
number of the tokens (resp. attributes) used in the authorisation
varies from 2 to 10 with 10 runs for each number of tokens
to acquire the averaged results. All the experiments use an
equivalent cryptographic security level (128-bit security) [18].
Fig. 4: The computational time cost of encryption and decryp-
tion algorithms in the schemes ESPAC and GAA-FQ on the
conventional computer
The simulation result is depicted in Figure. 4. Since the
bilinear pairing operations cost much more time in ESPAC,
the time efficiency of our GAA-FQ is significantly superior.
On average, the time consumption of GAA-FQ is only about
6% that of ESPAC in terms of the encryption and decryption
algorithms. In addition, the time cost’s growth rate of our
encryption and decryption algorithms is lower than the relative
growth rate in ESPAC by Figure. 4.
Next, we repeat the above simulation on the Raspberry Pi
2 with only changing the number of the used tokens (resp.
attributes) to 5, 10 and 15. Meanwhile, we test the time cost
of encrypted data transmission over Wi-Fi in the two schemes.
The data transmission is implemented based upon Python-2.7
socket communication. The length of the plain response data
from the agent layer to the user layer is 256 bytes.
The simulation results in Figure. 5 show that the comparison
result of the computational time cost on the Raspberry Pi 2
is consistent with the results on the conventional computer.
On the other hand, for the transmission efficiency, the time
cost of the encrypted data transmission over Wi-Fi increases
linearly with the number of attributes in ESPAC. However,
the corresponding time cost in GAA-FQ is lower and kept
stable i.e. it is non-sensitive to the number of tokens. This
Fig. 5: The comparison of the computation and transmission
time cost on the Raspberry Pi 2 for ESPAC and GAA-FQ
is because the additional contents in the encrypted data of
ESPAC includes all the used attributes for the following
decryption, while in GAA-FQ, the additional part is only the
contents of one point regardless of the number of the used
tokens.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose what we believe is the first
architecture with flexible granular access authorisation to
support flexible queries, GAA-FQ, for Blockchain-oriented
EMR in eHealth. Compared with the existing work, e.g.,
ESPAC, GAA-FQ does not require PKI to authorise the access
or encrypt/decrypt the queried EMRs. The proposed access
authorisation scheme combined with three exemplar types of
queries achieves a finer granular control when authorising
different queries. As a result, a Blockchain-based EMR can
respond to a requester without leaking unauthorised private
data efficiently, especially for a resource-constrained device
in an IoT eHealth system.
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